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6In this thesis 1 have read all of the periodicals and
have cuotea at length a number of them. In fact, practic-
ally all of them kvere used in the vvriting of ray thesis,
in the matter of books I have used the folLowinp- for the
basic work: Collier, Ripley, Jones, Jenks, Fay and i.ly.
The other books which I used have been for specific things
which were necessary to know in the ivriting of this ,vork.
For example, 1 used Filene's book because of his ideas on
mass production; I used Taft's book because of his legal
ideas in regard to trust la^vs; and 1 used iaussig's chap-
ter on monopolies and trusts in considering the dangers of
trusts. In fact, I have used practically all of these books
mentioned in ray bibliography for some purpose in tiiis vvork,
WaturaliV, since the Federal Trade Commission and the Clay-
ton Act have been in existence only sixteen years, I have
resorted to the use of periodicals for a great amount of
the facts concerning them, and the recent trend of mono-
polies •

Purpose _of Tlissis
Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of l^ew York stated in one
of His speeches the follo»/ing, ^"/ire .is threatened .vitn such
a centralization and consolidation of industrial resources--
£T°at combinations of capita l--that we may have to bring forth
a ne.7 Lieclaration of independence. The huge mergers ana con-
solidations which are going on toaay are challenging in their
power the very government itself." 'ihis statement in itself
is sufficient to make us realize tnat the question of reg-
ulation of such monopolies is a gre^t one.
before stating my purpose in vvritin^'; tnis article, let
me consider some significant statements in regard to this
C .
question. The socialists tell us that these combined in-
terests in transportation--mines
,
oil, timber, etc. have be-
come a power «7ith which the government cannot cope and that
we are at the present moment governed by these monopoly in-
terests and snail continue so to be governed Ui til the state
has absolute posession of thera." This is the radical vie.v of
the socialists which again brings to us the great question
which remains to be ans.vered in regard to monopol ies --what
shall we do with them?
un the other hand, Charles Fay in his book 'Too iuuch
Government, Too WiUch Taxation' appeals to tne government tO
keep its hands off big business ana let it live. undoubted-
1. Another Roosevelt 'irust Bus ter--i^iterary Digest--July 20, ly29
The Conflict between Private Monopoly and Good Citizenship
brooks--p. 27
t
ly these statements will snow to the reaaers that the prob-
lems of mergers, trusts and monopolies is really a great
question which must be decided sooner or later by the people
of the Unitea States.
The writer proposes to further the interests of econ-
omic study with a special reference to the study of the con-
crete problem of the great public and private interest in
the regulation of the monopoly movement of the past and fut-
ure. It is hoped that this article will contribute to pub-
lic opinion so that a fair policy in the regulation of mon-
opoly may result. This study primarily will consider the
monopoly--Gspecially the trust form in its many phases, but
particularly the regulation of monopolies by the legislation
of 1914 Federal Trade Commission >tCt and tne Clayton Act.
Furthermore, the writer will attempt to offer some construct-
ive criticism in an attempt to solve the great question,
'the regulation of monopoly'.
iixplanator y Introduction
in uraer to make a stuay of this type it is essential
that we aefine what a monopoly or trust is, its activities
ana tue need of regulation. in order to understand the
present, we must understana tne past; and therefore the
writer intends to consider the early attempts at regulation
undar Common i^aw and tne Sherman /ir.ti- trust Lavv. After a
study of these it -viil be necessary to ciscuss' tne trust

Lagislation of 19L4. This .vill involve the discassion of
tne poivers and duties of tue jf'ederai IradQ Commission as
v'/eLi as its finain^^iS in some of its investigations, After
considering aii these raethoas of regulation, the writer will
then etiecipt to arj'ive at some solution. inasmucii as the
Federal Trade oom.nission has oriiy been in existence sixteen
years and the great merger movement has been a recent trend,
it has been necessary to refer to recent articles in mag-
azines and perioaicals rather than to textbooks on trusts.
In fact the textbooks have not had the opportunity of keep-
ing up With tne times, so rapidly has tne trena for merger
anu amalgamation anv^ jonso lida tion taken root.
The Meaning of ivionopo ly
i.tymologica 1 ly speaking, the .vord monojjoly means sole
(po\7er of) selling. lixcluaive ability, po.ver or legal right
is granted to the person or company having a monopoly. Thus
the ivord monopoly means an exclusion. The old idea of a
monopoly has been someivnat modified however. in the early
days a monopoly was an exclusive rignt vvhicn w&s granted to
one person or a fe'.v persons in something which was once a
common right. In other words, it ivas a special and an ex-
clusive rij-ht in trade bestowed b,> the king. An example of
an early monopolv mijiit have been the exclusive right which
was given to the iiast India Company by the king. This ri,-}ht
gave the company exclusive control of the trade and coloniza
i
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tion in a certain territory. 'iliis iuea, ho.vevsr, v;as repug-
nant to the institutions of free, people and died out rather
suadenly. The dictionary proviaes us .vitn tne definition of
5
monopoly as " t.-e exclusive rif;:.t or privilege of engaging
in a particular traffic, especially such control, as of a
coiiOmoaity, as alioivs prices to be raised." This definition
is a good one, but I believe that ttie words of a judge of
the iNievv' vork Superior Ooui't will perhaps clear up this point
4,
more easily. ..uage Barrett of this court states that "a
monopoly is any combination tne tendency of ivhich is to pre-
vent competition in its broad and general sense, and to con-
trol ana thus, at v/ili, enhance prices to ihe detriment of
the pu. lic--nor neea it be permanent or complete. it is
enough tnat it may be either temporarily or partially suc-
cessful. The question in tho end is ''^.oes it inevitably tend
to public injury?"'. Tiiis statement of ti^e learned iudge is
somewhat biased; but- it states tne real definition .'Vhen it
says it is the tenaenc;. to prevent competition and practically
leads to sole control. The main thing ^vhich brings out tnis
uefinition as difi'erent from t ^e dictionary is that it is not
necessary that t e control or po.ver be permanent or complete,
in this respect tne monopoly of toaa . is somewhat changed
from tne monopoly of the iiast inaia ^^ompany in the early days,
Taussig says, "^"that an industry controlling fifty or sixty
percent of an output is a monopoly". In otiier ^vords, Taussig
o. runk .lagnall's btandara bic tionc^ry
4. The Trus t--Col lier--p. 92
5. Trinciplds of x-Conomics-- iaussig--p. 455
i
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claims that it is not necessary to have sole po^ver over sn
industry, but ratiier control over about half of it in order
to be a monopoly. biy states, "that a monopoly is any-
thing which confers upon t)iose -vino enioy it a special and
peculiar econo io privilege, v/hatever this special and pec-
uliar econo'tiiic privilege may be." Thus, .ve have tne diction-
ary, the lav/yer and t^vo economists' vie.vs on the definition;
so vve can draw the conclusion that a monopoly is a substant-
ial controlling unity of action.
form s of i.xono. ly
iuonopolles break themselves up into many classes and in
order to understana them »ve must uo.isider a few of the best
known types, always remembering that our greatest interest
in monopoly is the capitalistic type as exemplified by the
common-used word, the trust. In general, monopolies break
themselves up into two main groups, i.e. tne public mon-
opoly ana tne private monop-.ly. Ihe public monopoly is one
which is ovmea ana Of-'ersted i y a political division such as
a nation, state or city, and that division is tne sole bene-
ficiary of the business. As an example of this, we can point
to the many city-ownea gas and electric plants, railways and
water works. m contrast to this, .ve have tne private mon-
opoly, wnich is a tusinees or a skill owned and operated by
a private person, a natural person or a group of people.
6. Monopolies and 'irusts--jily--p.5
iI
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John ...coormack exemplifies tne private monopoly of his voice.
The Aluminum 'irust of America ,vou Id exemplify the private
business or private monopoly of business. It is possible for
us to have a mixture of these t.vo types, as, for example,
v;here a oity ovms monopolistic property -vnich is managed by
a private person or vice versa, -in example of tnis .vould be
a streat railway company owned by a city but operated by a
private coiupany.
Then again .ve may have a civision of monopolies into
social monopolies an^ natural monopolies, ''A social mon-
opoly is one widch arises out of a social sr r'angemsnt , and
is an expression of tne will of society as a .vhole through
government or of a section of society stron, enought to im-
pose its ;viil un sjjiety." /im;ng t.-e types of social mon-
opolies are the foli.o.ving; a patent, ..'liiCii is a rl,_J:it given
by tne government securing to tlie inventor tiic exclusive
ri£ht of making and using an invention for a certain definite
number of years; a copyright, VjiCi is an exclusive legal
right 01' autnors ana artists to publish anu dis>;os3 of their
ivork for a certain length of time. Ihese t.vo types are con-
sidered to be very good, because of the great benefit v/hich
they bestovv on society as veil as tne j-'ro tect ion v/hici] they
afford tne inventor or artist. The thira is a pubiij con-
sumption ..onopoly, vaiich is a state controlled monopoly'- of
7. Lionopoiiea end Trusts--iily--p, 4b
iI
certain types of gooas for tuS p'- iic; for example, the al-
cohol monopoly of S.v i tzer lanci . Ihe fourtn are trade-u.arks
,
wnich are certain marks or figures which are to oistinguish
certain particular types or brands of roods. 'ihese are riven
.7ith the idea of proteotin^: busioesa from infringement upon
tne names of their goods. ijucn a monopoly is exemplified by
the name 'iMabisjo', .vixicn ta a trade name ana a valued asset
of a business. Ihe flftii are fiscai tnonupo i i es , .vuich are
sstablisned for a pr^rit or revenue tj the government trea-
sury; perhaps the greatest of this type is tiie tobscoo mon-
opoly in i<T&nce. This monopoly is used for revenue purposes
ana is often solu out to privt'te concerns, as in France wliere
the bchulte ..ntei'dsta have aocuired tiie control. 'lo these
,ve may aca tne ^.ast md ia Company type of monopoly wnich is
based on public favoritism ana .vaose sol^ prestir;e and po.ver
aepende.. on the kin-'s v/ish. 'xhis type, however, has prac-
tical_y disappearea.
Another classification of monopolies ai-e t.uose knovm
as natural monopolies, ;uicn rest u^.oi. natural arrangements
as a is tinguished from social arrangements. 'mere are three
types of natLirai monopolies .'iiilcn stcna out preeminently.
Ihe first type is Lhe ra.v material mjL.>j^^ ij , ^i.ich of course
arisss from a linntea supply of ra«Y materials.
.i very good
example of this ty^.e is tiie hluminu,.i Co:npan-. of r-.merica,
w.iich has practically control of ti.e aluaiinum asposits of the
i
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united States. 'ihe second type is one .viiijJri arises from
properties inherent in tirie business. ouch tj^pes .vould be
exemplified by tne telephone, tLe telegraph or the grain
elevator. 'ihe ttiird type is the secrecy moJ^opoly which is
based upon secrecy. As an example of this, we can consiaer
tne ivrupp iianufactur e of gun powder or the manufacture of
the paper for our paper money. Still another type is that
wiiioh depends upon personal skill, such as the hana of Ra-
phael or the voice of Jonn ivicuorcnack. 'ihese are gifts n'hich
no one else can take over.
Another type in tnis classification might possibly be
the unions of j_,o . or and ±ndustry, .vhicii create a monopoly
of the labor supply. The final class ana t..e one 'V:.ic;h is
most important in tnis study is aivided into thres types--
tne absolute, tne complete, ana the particular or inconplete
monopoly. An absolute monopoly is, as its name icipiies, a
completely controlled one, such c.s a gas or electric company
in the. city wnich has no competitors, because no one was able
to conpete iirith it. A complete monopoly is one in which there
is unity of action on the part of those in tne business, al-
though they may not be in absolute control. In other words,
it is business .vhich has a very small number of competitors,
gnd thus is not in absolute control. Finally, there is the
partial or incomplete monopoly wnich means control of seventy-
five to ninety percent of the supply ('Xaussig says sixty percent)
(
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or in otiier woras the cumpany iias so much of the field that
they are atle to restrain competition. it is in this class,
namely the partial monopoly that our capitalistic monopoly,
the trusts, consoliaa tions and mergers fail. The word 'trust'
has been used to cover all of these types so that hereafter
when the k'<ord trust is used it will be considered as synon-
omous with monopoly.
Types of Capita lis tic luonopoly
The word 'trust' has been pervertea from its original
legal meaning so that now many people call a trust anything
wnica is controlled by a large company. This is not true,
as a trust may be larre or it may be small. The first trust
wiiich was an actual trust v/ss the Standard Oil Go-npany, '.vhich
was organized in 1662. Tnis .vas a trust in the real legal
sense of tiie vvord. T:ie firms and corporations which wanted
to bombine tneir interests did not merge as they do today,
nor dia the companies sell to one large company or uolding
b,,
company. instead the several proprietors of different
companies remainec in eq. ity distinct but all transferred
in trust their r-i[;lits to a certain few persons as trustees
to manage them in the interacts of the several o.vners". To
explain this matter legally, tij.e separate owns s becsine what
is known as the cestuis cue trust, and they held what was
known as tne doii table title, v/j ile tne trustees >Vi.o .vere
6. The Trusts--Co i iier--p. 21

ib
ohosen by the cestuis were ,Aven the Legal title to Lhe pro-
perty. To take a simpler example, if i leave ,000 to a
in trust for b until he is twsnty-une, A becomes tne legal
owner of tae property or the money with the auty to pay it
over to the cestui cue trust, .jno has the equitable title
and a right to the property vvnen he beco;iies t.venty-one years
of age.
The saine iaea prevailed in tne early trust. 'lhe trust-
ees got the legal title anu gave the certificates to the
cestuis (owners) of tneir respe^^tive proportionate shares
in the aggr8g;>te. in this .vay the several coiipa. ies had one
policy, one management, o.-e great combination of marketing,
price making, and profit sharing. The purpose for wj.ich
most of the trusts have been organized is some degree of
monopoly. As statea heretofore the btanaard uil Company
was the first trust and it gradually drove out oil inde-
pendent oil ajalers. To get- the iaea of a trust -ve must
remember that it is different from the corporation which
manji people consider a trust.
9
"a corporation means a group of pei-s^ns holding capital
in shares organized to carry on so ne business tlirougli tlie
directoi's and of: icer^i." iLe .vorst trust incluses all of this
but .vith. the additional aaeanin^; that it owns most of the plants
in its line of business and hol^. s in some measure a monopoiy
9. flain i^'acts as to irusts and lar iff --Lo len--p. lO
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of tne supply or tne commov... ity it pr-oauces" . rrOr. tnis
statement .ve can unaerstanci that tnere is a ;^reat c.if-
ference betwean the ivord cor p or a t ion and the //ord trus t .
A comparative!;,, ne.v expedient to restrain competition
"I'ms the modern trust. ihe trust vvas affected in one of
10
tvi/o ways: "eitner by means of a security ho Lain- corpor-
ation--that is a company owning ali or part of the securities,
or other securities of other companies; or by means of a
property holaing compauy, o>'Vning outriglit the plants and other
properties of the company. " The unitea States Steel Corp-
oration was one of the first of these formed after 1898.
11
"Its purpose was to perform the service of owning and
controlling tne stock of the separate corporations united;
that is, it ov/ns the shares for tne owners. Its shares
vvere exchanged for the shares of the separate companies,
according to tlie differiiig values of ti^e latter, and be-
ing the maj'ority stock holder, it manages each of the
companies through absolute poivers of choosing their dir-
ectors."
The difference bet.veen the oil trusts and tne steel
corporation '.«;as that the oii trusts had no legal right
as such, as it vifas not incorporated, but rested on the
trust agreement wnich equity enforcea. ^n the other hand,
tne steel trust took as its business the o.vning and vot-
ing of the stock of the companies it had united, and has
10. Tne Tr'ost problem in the united Sta tes--Jones--p. k;7
11. flain Facts as to Ti-usts ana Tar iff--bolen--p. 10
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been legally incorporated by stats laws to perform that
service. The present type of merger will be considered
later in this article, so the writer will not consider
it here. Monopoly has taken many types and at the pre-
sent time is increasing by leaps and bounds,
Activities of Monopolies
The various forms of monopolies and especially the
capitalistic monopolies have been considered, but the
activities in which they have taken part have liOt, odaa
mentioned. Monopolies have invaded practically all lines
of business and industry except farming and soft coal
mining. They have gained control of the industry, although
there are et this time a very few, if any, absolute mon-
opolies. We find a tendency toward monopoly in banking,
food control, autom.obile manufacturing, lighting, trans-
portation and in fact in prpctically every line of bus-
iness. Viiriile today, there does not exist the same type of
trusts as the Standard oil of yesteryears, we nevertheless
have the monopoly and its activities embrace practically
all of the great industries of tne country.
The Need of Ketiulation
It is natural for anyone to ask 'why do we consider
a monopoly; as beinr, bad; why ao we have need of regulation?'.
Among the reasons why we may need re{^:ulation are the follow-
ing. In the case of i/'Arcy vs. Allein tne evils of monopoly
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were stated in these .vorcis; ' i^'irst, the price of tne same
commodity .vill be raised, for he who has the sole selling
of any comtnoaity may and will make the price as he pieases--
the secona incident to monopolies is that after the monopoly
is granted a coramoaity, it is not so good and merchantable
as it was before; for the monopolist having the sole trade,
regards only his private benefit and not the community--
thirdly, it tends to the impoverishment of diverse artific-
ers and others.'* Let us consider briefly the evils 'jhich
exist according to tne quotation, in the early days, the
monopoly would have control in certain states and in those
states where it had control it would charge whatever price
it vvished. In the states where the trusts got some compet-
ition it proceeded to lower tiie cost of goods even below
production price, 'ihus , tne place in which the trust was
in control was forced to suffer from tne hi,r:ii priceo be-
cause they had to pa^ for tne cut-throat competition in
Wiiich the monopoly was taking part in another state. Thus,
there was no checking of the price w.jich the monopoly
could charge.
The second argument in the quotation stated that when
a company got a monopoly its proaucts were not as good as
before. In spite of sociology people are human and they
want large returns on tnsir money. If they have a monopoly
12. Monopolies and Trusts--i.ly--p. 217
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they are sbLe to --ive inferior goods and tns ptiblic must
pay aittiougn under corapetitiori the; might pjet better goods
at the same price. Furthermore, trie ' third arfmment was
that monopolies tended to put tiie small person out of bus-
iness, «,hile tnis mijht not be wron^ per se, it -vas .vrong
when tue companies used unfair methods to gain their con-
trol over the small business man. monopolies tend to create
a monopoly in the control of tne labor supply by its cut-
throat metnoQs of driving out tne inaiviv^ual o./ners. ,iith
the control of ti^e labor supply tne; een bring abuut econ-
omic slavery to the mass of tne .vorkers. It is on account
of the ocious cnaracter of private monopolies that the
Anglo-Saxon d^untries nad claimed them to be against the
principles of their liberty and therefore have not aiiovved
theoi to go uncontrolled. The trusts have been dishonest
to e very gi^eat extent.
Thomas jbawson who may not have been above board himself,
considerBd the case of the i-.ma Igamatea Copper, which .vas
started in 1699 and in the first five years of its existence
plundered m;^ny million dollars from the people. in order
to see .vhat they really did, let us cuote a fe'./ lines from
13,,
Mr. i^avvson's Ovvn book. Right here, the crime of the
Araa Igamatea was born, not so much tne legai crime as the
moral crime. in tue etnics of ^all Street the heineousness
13. Frenzied pinance--^£ wr:on--p . 26

of the transaction lies in tne facts that the public was com-
paliec to pay q{.36 ,000,000 proiit to a few men who had in-
vested but
.;i)39 ,000,000 and the ;)39,000,000 did not even
belong to them- -but in the fact that liiP . Rogers and i.ir. Rock-
efeller had given to their associates, what in the vernacular
of the street is termed the '^.louble crocs'."
Thus we can see tnat those in control of monopolies man-
ipulated the market in order to fleece the trusting invest-
ors. In fact these monopolies vvatered their stocks ana the
public took the loss, iven the laws of our country .vere made
and enforced by dollars received from big business. In fact
money was used to steer elections of even candidates for the
presiaency. Thus big business and especially the trusts
played a great deal of part in the corruption vmich took place
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. inasmuch
as I shall consider some of tne dangers of monopolies later
in this article, i have only considered a fe.v here. These
facts alone would justify regulation of some sort, but the
great question is ho.v can -va regulate, hxperience is often
the best teacher, so, therefore, we shall turn to history of
the regulation movement.
Comrion j-aw Re;':uiation
Before any la.vs .vere passea by state or national govern-
ments, monopolies ivare governed by common law, a system of
jurisprudence originating in custom or usage, as, for example.
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the eommbn La.v of £.ngLand. 'ihe rule wiiioh was early estab-
lished in tiiQ £..ngj.ish L,&:i .vas tnat contracts in resti-aint
of trade ivere void ana therefore .vere not enforceable. In
fact, a person aas- not allovifed to contract that he would
stay out of business anu, if he aid it could be held void,
unless the area .vhere he viBS to refrain from doing business
was very narrow, as, for example a city or town, I'his idea
of restraint of trade was evolved because the early judges
of England believed in the tneory of competition as one of
tne things which helped business. in order to protect tnis
competitive rigut, the courts refused to allow any restraints
in trade whetner by contract or by the purchasing of a
business, nowevei*, in practically all laws tnere is a loop-
14
hole. "if considered vvith reference to tne situation, bus-
iness and objects of tae p&rties, and in the lignt of all
the surrounaing circumstances, with reference to jvnich the
contract was made, tiie restraint contractea for appears to
have been for a just and honest purpose for the protection
of legitimate interests of the party in whose favor it is
imposed, tne restraint <vill be held valid." Therefore, even
in tne earliest .times we find that t.-e courts began to be-
lieve in technicalities ana some restraints in trade were
held valid. A study of the early common la^v in our own count-
ry shows us that tne State of iviichigan Oourt in twenty-seven
Michigan 15 law reports propounded t: e same doctrine as the
14. 'ihe Trust Problem in tlie linitea Sta tes--Jon3s--p. 301
I
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Ii^nglish Court nad done. Thus most of the state courts event-
ually adopted the idea that a restraint in trade i'/as invalid
unless the restraint contracted for appeared to be for a just
and honest purpose. Thus «¥e started our idea of regulating
monopoly by an 'if' and a 'but' and .ve have conLinued the
same idea up to the present time. in other words, there is
no aefinite terminology or definition of what restraint
is and what it is not.
In order for a la.v to be absolutely successful, it is
necessary tlia t the laiv be precise and definite and that it
have no loop-holes for evasion of it. 'ihe perfect law is
one where a person is unable to escape its workings through
technicalities, Tiie reason the anti-trust la-vs have been
ineffective since their inception has been due to the
\agueness and the lack of ability of the courts to defin-
itely show what restraint of trade really is. To consider
trade combinations at common law fully, it would take
many volumes but the .vriter vvill attempt to take a fe-v more
of the high points in its decisions.
Before tne Sherman Act, agreements aiming to raise
prices were held to be illegal, une of these cases .vas
that of Raymond vs. j^eavitt oejided in iiiiohigan in which
15
the courts stated that "tne object of the agreement
between these parties vvas to force a fictitious and unnat-
15. Trusts, Pools and oorabinations--hipley--p
. 457
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ural rise in the wneat market for the express purpose of
getting tne aavantage of dealers and purchasers ;\fhom
necessity compelled to buy, and necessarily to create a
similar difficulty as to all persons vvho had to obtain
or to use that commoaity which is an article indispensable
to every family of- the country." In other words the court
held that monopolies which were formed to raise prices
were illegal. In fact many courts went further and held
that monopolies raising prices could be tried criminally.
The courts even went furtner ana held that monopolies
raising prices should have them regulatedin the absence
of the economic theory of supply and demand. If com-
petition played its part the theory of supply and demand
would aid competitive spirit and a fair price .vould be
reached, ihere was some logic to tiie court's aecision
when they held that combinations of employees to raise wages
was illegal, because if they did not hoia that vvay, the
employer had the same legal right to raise pay for his own
advantage; ana therefore trie common law iaea of conspiracy
to raise prices fell witn a clash, unce there is a loop-
hole in the law, people wiil attempt to evade it.
The state courts i-iere not the only ones that held
combinations in restraint of trade illegal ana criminal,
for the Federal Courts also held restraints illegal.
i
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Judge Harlan in the i^'ederal Court stated that in the case
of the American Sugar Refinery tnat ^"""a combination such
as that organizea under the name of the /imerican Sugar
Refinery has been uniformly held by tne courts of the state
to be agaiiiSt public policy and illegal, because of its
necessary tendency to impose Improper restraints upon trade-
the American Sugar Refining Company now controls ninety-
eight percent of all tne sugar refining business in the
country, ana therefore cot.trols the price of that article
everywhere." This aicta seems to shObV that the main rea-
son for the court making its decision against monopolies
is that a combination or monopoly would interfere in
price-making. Thus, the earliest decisions only considered
the question of restraint of trade as a factor in interfer-
ence with the normal price fixed by supply and demand. They
did not consider the social argument that monopolies tend
to drive out the small or independent owner who has worked
hard to establish a business ana no.v because of unfair
methods of monopolies is forcea to be iaie, nor aid they
consider tne economic slavery of the servant or cog-in-the-
wheel of this great juggernaut of destruction, the Trust.
The combination monopoly and the trust haa not gained a
foothold in tuis early peri^u of our I^ation's history; but
by the year 1890, ^ne,> had become cuite numerous, so tnat
16. Trusts, Pools and iuonop,; Lies--Ripl3y--p. 479
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it ivas necessary for other laws to be made in order that the
monopoly could be regulated.
The Sherman Act of 1890
As stated heretofore prior to tiie year 1887 industrial
combinations in the United States Wc3re only in tne incub-
ator stai,e. A few combinations, among wnich w&s the
Standard Oil Company, had enraged the public by their
monopolistic actions, undoubtedly, the actions of this
company did more to bring a change in the law than anything
else. The railroad combinations had arousea the ire of the
people, but they were taken care of or regulated by the
Inter-state Comnerce Act of 1887. However, the success of
the Stanaard uii Trust led others, such as tiie whiskey and
sugar businesses, to form monopolies. The trusts, ti^e real
ones, made their appearance and the Amerii:an public jlam-
orea for regulation, T-ey demandec it and finally Senator
Sherman of uhio proposed a bill which would declare all
combinations, conspiracies ana agreements in restraint of
trade unlawful. His idea v?as not accepted, but instead a
bill drafted by Senator noar of Massachusetts was substituted,
and finally, it was passed an^ was kno^/n as the Sherman
Anti- trust Lavv.
The act itself contair^s a great many words but it will
suffice here to point out the salient features of it.
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''Section 1 makes illegal every contract, combination in
form of tiust, or conspiracy in restraint of trade, and
gives a penalty for breaking. Section 2 is against monop-
olizing or attempting to monopolize part of the trade or
commerce among the several states or ^vitti foreign nations.
Section 3 Declares illegal every contract, combination in
the form of trusts or otnerwise, or conspiring in restric-
tion of trade or commerce in anv way. Section 4 invests
tne circuit court with jurisdiction to enforce the la»v
and provides that tiie feddral government may institute
proceedings in equity to prevent ana restrain any violation
thereof. Section 7 confers upon persons injured by
violation of the law, the rignt to sue the offending party
for treble damages and the cost of suit." Ihis law be-
came effective in 1890 and still remains on the statute
books of our r^ational Government.
Before criticizing the law constructively or destruct-
ively/', let us consider what some people think or have
thought of it. Albert ^alker, one of tne most prominent
members of the i^iew York Bar, stated in an article in 1911
18
that the " Sherman /inti-Trust jua./ is the Magna i>^iiai'ta
among the Statutes of tne united States. It .vilj. never
be repealed or alterea." 'Ihis statement b;_ one of the
leading attorneys in iMew iork shows unquestionably the
17. Monopolies, rools and oorabinations--hiple y--p . 251
16. Histor.v of the Si.erman ijaw--tar ker--lMashville /imsr ican--p . 5
m
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value in 'which he held this I a.v. bince iua;:na c^harta is
the basic liberty lavv of Lngland, we can easily see the
great value vvhicn inr . .vslker gave to this law,
un the o trier hana, one of the most outstanding
presiaents of tiie ^nitea btates, Theodore Roosevelt,
19,
said in a message to Congress that he repeatedly
called attention to that Body and the puoiic to the
inadequacy of tne anti-trust law (the bherman Act)
itself to meet business conditions snc secure Justice
to the psople.'* in otr^er .vords, 'Teddy*, in spite of
his ability to combat trusts, believed that the bherman
iict .vas not adecuate.
Iidward Russell, a writer of economics states that
"you cannot change a world-wide condition by dosing
it with Dr. bherman 's Celebrated iierb Tea for li'usts
and boi Is"
.
he have heard what otners have said; let us con-
sider it ourselves. in tue first section every contract,
combination in tne form of trust^^, or otner^idse in re-
straint of traue is illegal. This is very vague. V.hat
is restraint of trade? Is thei-e never any restraint in
trade wuich may be gooa? The ouestion arises gs to
whether restraint is good or bad, and vviia t is restraint
19. iiditori&l--Roosevelt--*^'UtLook--ifOv. ib, 1911--vol. 99 p. 649
iiO. Business the Heart of t- e A^ation--Rusaell --p. 219
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in trade. It is just a ^roup of w^ras, tns .:^e&ning of which
must be determined by the courts. Thus, one coes not know
when he goes into a big business, ./hether he is in restraint
of trade or not. lie must wait for the court to decide. If
a man gets a patent on an article he really restrains trade.
If he sells cheaper than his competitors and causes the
competitors to arop out of business, he is restraining trade.
V.hat does this article mean? iio one has aefinitely defined
it and no one has vvorked out the definition of a good re-
straint of trade. There can be a good restraint of trade.
Some people are working in small factories .vhere the owner
of the business as veil as the workers are receiving small
money returns, ana the public is paying a high price for
the goods. why? because there is no up-to-date system of
21
production. becretary Davis states "that the real cure
in tne soft coal industry is some form of cooperation or
consolidation .vithir. the industry. bince the bherman
Act. may apply to this type of business, the bherman -^aw
should be changed to meet the present conditions.'" The
law aoes not consider the fact that some com-bir.a tio is and
trusts like the above may be inherently good to the owner,
the worker and the public.
In this respect the law has been somewhat of a failure.
It is not distingulsxied between good and bad trusts and, as
a result, all of them have been obliged to fall. The law
21. Soft Coal ana the bherman
-:-.ct--i>avis--M8gazine of Busine
vol. 54 --Jet. 1928-
-p. 3o9
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W9S passed because the people .vere in a ra3e and this unfair
Law has remained on the Statute books. Any law passed in a
hurry is bouna to result in more or less trouble. Just what
constitutes a coatrsct in restraint of tr&de, sucn as courts
will hold void, has been occasion of nice legal discrimination.
Some contracts have been held reasonable, but as a .general
rule those agreements which tena to bring a rise in prices
higher than under free competition have been held to be
restraints of trade. The main reason that monopolies cid
not spread up to i914 ivas that competition from outside
caused the >voula-be monopoly to crumble away, during this
period, .vl, ile the Sherman ^aiv .vas in effect, tiie original
trusts died out and were succeeded by t:.e holding-company
V7hich Tias a corporation formea to accuire the majoi'ity
stock of several combining concerns and trius get control.
The directors became the managers and the original cor-
porations existea and nominally conaucted tbe business, but
the control was in tne hanos of tne directors. J-n S].^ite of
the change in tt.e character of tne organization, the Sherman
j_.a*v still remained in effect. If the la;V was enforces to
the limit, business -vouIq have gone back hundreds of years.
The courts, however, saw tne disastrous effects which
might have occurreo to business, if any restraint was
sufficient to ^ring business to the Bar of Justice. hs a
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result tiiS courts ''gradually liave applied tlie hule of
heasori and to lay more emphasis in motive, intent, ana
methoas, ana lesb upon form''. The bnerman Anti-lrust i^a//^
just like the Ooramon ijaw, W£s changed by a court decision
into a jumbled mass of questions. „hat is meant by reas-
onacla restraint of trade? Ihis is also vsgue. V/hat
Goulc. business ao? They were obliged to ask the courts
to Qecide ii' their -^^Pstraint v;as reasonable or not, and
business became confused again. tionie people say that the
Sherman Act has a one some good, for it broke up the Stan-
dard uil L.o:r.<pany, but really that -./as ineffective, because
tiie company separated into the stanai^ra ^il Company of he.v
York, hG\'i Jei'sey and unio , but tiie sa.r.e people jontrolled
the separate companies, and altnough they Competed against
each oti.er, they in reality remainec tiie same.
The la>.v cannot sto,. any group of men from owning stock
23
in different companies. ''a stuay of ti.ebe statutes
(oom ion _aw and Sherman Law) anc^ of tne decisions of our
courts of last resort, iv.iich have been made under them, -.vili
shov^ that they iiave had comparatively little, practically
no effect, as regards the treno of our industrial develop-
ment." it is oniy recently that tne labor bodies nave ob-
24„jected to this la*;, because at first 11 restrained em-
The Trust again--AtiYooc--Saturday ji.vening i:ost--Sept. ^i, i929
Voi. 202-
-p. 6
23. The irus t Problem--Jenks--p. 21o
24. Appljing tne Snerman AGt--l'r ey--Amer icgn L<abor i^egislation
i.evie.v--Sept. 1928--p. 302
m#
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ploj^ers from committing an illegal act, and later it re-
strained organized -vork-men f]om any activity to as-iist in
protecting taeir rignts." ihe public obieci to it because
big business has increassd in spite of it, and prices have
not been lov/ered perceptibly; tne employer objects to it
because it interferes .vith his business expansion, and it
is not specific enough so that tna employer has been ob-
ligeo. to appeal to the courts.
jf'inally, labor objects to it, because it interferes
vitn their sight to combine and strike, because of the
equity court injunction as determined Dy tne i^herman Act,
une man claims tnat tne oherman Act has bean a failure,
25..
,because since Grant s time tne corporation enc. of
businesb nas managed muc.i better tne matter of judicial
appointments''. ..iiilc this may not be absolutely corre^^t,
the recent appointment of lur . .*iilia;ii i.vans hugnes to the
Supreme uoui't (iie was a former big business attorney)
might make anyone of this opinion. mci lental ly, there is
one advantage to the la/*'; namely, the decree of tne court
of equity -vnicxi is ti^e power to punish the breaker of tne
2b
la./V for contempt, iv.r . Taft saiu that the decree can
be snaped to suit ti-e situation so as tu stamp out the evil
of monopoly ana restraint ana yet to leaa capital and plant
ably organized to recuce the cost of produjtion and to carry
25. Business, the ueart of the ^•ation--husse ll--p. 131
26. Ihe Anti-lrust Act--'iaft p. 117

33
on legitimata business fur the benefit of tne public". in
spite of its defects, the act stiii remains on our statute
books, ana it probably '.viii, but it is losing po.ver by
recent court decisions.
Ko oseva It ' s j: I& n
»,hen Roosevelt was Iresident tis suggested a border
corniriiss ion with po.vers sorae.viiat similar to those of the
interst te commerce v^omini s sion lut covering the .vhole
field of interstate business, because he believed that
21
"it was impossible to break up all combinations be-
cause tixey vvere large ana successful, an^t to do so
.voulu put business back into tne ei'-nteenth century
competition. So, in place of the law suit he .vished the
government even to control monopoly prices and businesses
as rates on raii.vays are now". In other .vords, he .visued
to have a comiidssion appoir.ted :ilth power to regulate and
Control prices ano businesses in the Interest of the pub-
lic
.
Inis oOm'iission was never autuorized by la.v and it
was the work of noodrow wilson to make a real commission.
„ils./n believed that private monopoly .vas indefensible and
intoleraLie, and ti^erefore it was his duty to try to reg-
ulate them,
27. i.ditorial--Hoosevelt--v.utlook--i\ov. 18, i911--Vol. 99--p. 652
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Ihe Federal Irade G omii.is slon Act and the ulay ton Act
After years of a^^itation tne bherinan /iCt of i890 was
finally suppleraenteci by two acts enacted in 1914, the Federal
Traae Com:nission Law and the oiayton /inti-trust net, 'ihis
legislation was initiated by President idlson in January and
the 'irade Commission Act was passed on Septem er 26, 1914;
ivnil3 the o layton Act was si^^ned ucLober 15, 1914. 'ihese
t7/o laivs •neve passed with the idea of attempting to overtake
the advances .v: icn public opinion had made in the sconomic
idea of the past t>venty years.
It seemed tnst the guilties ' responsibility should be
more certain, and that the inaividuai should be protected
so that if he -vgre injured by an unlavvful combination, he
vouid not be obliged to -vait until the ijepartment of
Justice took a hand, but ratiier could brin^ action himself.
1 ur ther Tiure , tne makers of tne lyv felt that tne indiviaual
should be allowea to sue for damage ".vithout waiting for the
government to take action. Ihese, in brief, .vere soine of
the ideas w.rich led the framers to bring a: out these acts.
The Federal Trade Oom'ni ss ion Act
The first four sections of the trade commission lavv
largely prescribed tne form of tx^e comiiission and the man-
ner of succession anu routine details. As enacted, the
bill prescribes a com-'iission of five appointea by the
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president jvitn tne Senate's advice and consent. r.ot more
than three commissioners are to be of the same political
party and after tlie- first appointments, tne terms v/ill be
for seven years. bection tv70, three and four are very
general and relate to ssilaries, civil service rules, ex-
penses of the commission ana the dissolution of the Eureau
of Corporations.
The fiftii section of the Act, in reality, is tne stron
est of tne entire auts, for by it unfair rnethoas of compet-
ition fare declarea illegal and tne commission is given po.ve
to prevent unfair metnoas of competition, ana to compile
and inve s ti^^;a te trie econorriic facts concerning corporations
in commerce. 'ihe reaeral Tride Ooramission La-v is not an
anti-trust la.v of trie united States, but is rather a com-
mission for enforcing trust legislation. before consider-
ing ttie vYorking of the Feaeral Iraoe Oommission it .rill be
necessary to consider tne Clayton Anti- trust Act -vhich is
so linked up ./ith the j^'ederal Traae Commission Act that it
is almost a part of it.
Ihe G la y ton Act
Ihe Irade commission Act is unified while the Clayton
Act deals v/ith a great number of tilings. The -vriter //ill
attempt to discuss those applicable to trust legislation.
The idea of the olayton net ./as to supplement existing la.vs
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against monopolies and unlawful restraints of trace, or in
otner woras to supplement the Sherman Anti-trust i.a;v. I
shall consider those points .vniuh deal specifically i^itli
the preservation of tns open market of the early method
of competition,
in tne first place, the la.v proviaes that it is illegal
to discriminate bet^-een aifferent purchasers of commodities
ivnere the effect of tne a iscr i aina tion may be to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly/. States had reg-
ulations of this t-jpd, but they aio not prevent national
companies from changing their prices, so that the companies
could charge lower prices in the states kVhere the com.panies
had competition and hign prices .vhere they had no competition,
under this section if a trust stiirts local price-cutting
.Vi.ich, in any way, endangers the life of the competitors,
the t'ederal Trade Commission may orasr the trusts to re-
frain from this practice.
The objection to this article is, that by the time the
courts who can hear an appeal from the order have sustained
the decision, the small concern may have been put out of
business. Under this section there is a question of wnat
the trust can do in case tne inaepenaent companies loiver
tlieir prices in a certain community. m such a case, un-
aoubtedly, the trust may meet the lower price, but query
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woula ask can they lower the price belo.v their competitor.
However, tnere is also an 'if' to tne discr irnination, be-
cause tiie Act states txiat aiscr imina tion in regara "to
price on account of difference in grada, quality, or cuan-
tity of commodity" snail nut bd counted, mis v;ouia allovi;
the trust to -jakd some s iii^i.t difference in the grade of
goous, or in fact deceive the people in regard to the goods
ana thus secure the advantage wnich tne act intenos to make
impossible. as a matter of fact, price discri: ination ssems
to be a system of unfair methoos of competition so that it
appears as if this section is really surplusage, since it
can be taken care of by the Federal lirade Commission Act in
any case,
29
Section tliree declares that ''it is unlawful for
any person engaged in commerce in the course of such com-
merce to lease or make a sile or contract for sale of goods
whether patented or unpatented for use, consumption or re-
sale of gooas vjithln tne United States or to fix a price
charged therefore, or to discount from or rebate upon such
price on tne condition, agreement or understanding that the
lessee or purchaser tnereof should not use or deal in the
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other
commodities of a competitor or competitor of lessee or seller,
where the effect of such condition may be to substantially
28. iTUSts, Pools ana uombinations--hipley--p. 718
29. " " " " "p. 719
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prevent competition or teno to create a monopoly." This
section was aimed st tine so-caiied t^^ing contracts sucli as
those used by the united Si.oe iviachinery Cotapany. These ty-
ing contracts are operated as follows: shoe manufacturers
have to have lasting machines, ana the united Shoe Machinery
Company is the oniy factory from vvhich they can get them.
k»nen manufacturers made a contract to sell a lasting machine,
the company mads the buyer agree to use certain other mach-
ines of the company before they would lease or sell tiie
other machines. Thus the united Shoe Machinery Uompany
got an unfair advantage in the trade ana really forced the
buyers to take their machine and exclude other makers'
machines regardless of whether the latter were better or not.
This section attempted to take care of such contracts.
nOviever, there arose some criticism ovei' the word substantial.
This wora seams to be even broader than the vvord unreasonable
which is used in ti^e Sherman Act. Under tnis article it
would be very difficult to show that competition -.vas sub-
stantially lessened, however, this .'/as necessary in order
to protect dealers who disposea of goods through agents, such
as the xackard uar agency vvho are to aot as sole agents in
a certain community for that company. This latter idea //as
a way of marketing goods and it would be unfair to disturb
them in this way. However, if there was only one dealer or
•I
i
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vsry few dsalers in a certain town this .vouLct eventually be
a substantial lessening of competition. The coiitra^ts and
leases that tend to create or maintain monopoly were the
tnings vviiich congress meant to prohibit, and in this way,
they were fairiy sucuessful. 'ihus , it seems ^.s if this
unfair type of competition ".vould be done a'vay with by this
section. The eni'orcement of this article is also left to
the t'eaeral Trade Commission.
As stated heretofore, auring this period trusts had
gotten most of their control through what is known as the
holding company. Therefoi-e, it seemea natural that tue
frar.ers of this Act should consider the cuestion of holding
30
companies. Section seven proviaes "that no corporation
engaged in commerce shall accuire airectly or indirectly
the whole or any part of the stock or otner s lare of
capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce
where the effect of such aquisition may be to substantially
lessen competition between the corporation wnose stock is
acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to
reb train such commerce in any section or community, or tend
to create a monopuiy of any line of commerce."
by this article companies are prevented from acquiring
a stock in anotner corporation with the idea of substantially
Lessening competition; but corupanies
..qay invest in other
30. Trust, Tools ana oombinations--Kipiey--p. 720
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companies for investment purposes or they can form sub-
sidiary corporaiiuns to oar.'V on tneir la.vfui business.
Thus tnis section also is snotner .vi. ioji uepenas on legal
verba^^e
,
narnel;. 'substantially lessened compe 1 1 tior: . '
j.t S3 ems as if ti.is is something vvnich again will only
tend to confuse business men and others, for it will
depend upon tne court's interpretation, r ur ti.ermor e
,
tJie section states ti.at this "^^^^'.vill not affect nor
impair any right heretofore legally acouired.'' ihei-efore
tiiis section does not apply to any of the holding companies
( ana there were many) that were in existence at the time.
Thus, v/iiile tne la.v aio not legalize them, i c permitted
them to oerate in status quo,
Tne next section vvnich is of interest is section eight
vvhich states "after two years no person shall be at tne
same time a director in two or more corporations engaged in
commerce other than banks or common carriers any one of
which has a capital surplus and unaivided profit exceeding
^i>l ,000,000, if sucn corporations are oi' have heretofore been
com.petitors , so tiia t tlte elimination of competition by
agreement betiveen them would constitute a violation of any
of the provisions of any of the anti-trust lavvs," Thus
this section makes illegal interlocking directors, among
concerns wnich actually compete, provided t.ig agreement
31. Trusts, Pools and oombinations Ripley: --p. 720
32. " »' " p. 721
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among tiisse concerns wouia be illegal. It attempts to
prevent interlocking aire^torate in the same trade, so
that really the business can be operated as if one, or
operated to bring about a monop' ly or restraint of trade.
,ihtle this section is important, it is as practical
purposes go a failure, for-, really, ths control is in the
hands of the s tocki o Ider s . ihe oniy way to prevent unfair
comptetition in tais 'Vay is to prevent ij-^tar locking stock-
holo.ers: tnat is, prevent stockholders fi'orn o-./ning shares
in competing companies . xn other woras, whet v/ill prevent
my buying (exceiit the inoney) t:.e controlling snares in
the rord ivi. tor company anu also the General iviotors? I
might control both companies ana put Different directors in
each. That is wiiat really happenea in the breaking up of
the Standard uil Company many years ago. ihe only salvation
is the prevention of the buying of stock in competirig oum-
panies
.
Tiiese four articles ;vhich i have attempted to explain
are enforced by the interstate commerce Commission when they
applv to common cari'iers, by the r'ederal Reserve Board ^vhen
they apply to banks, a no, finally, in the Federal Trade Com-
mission .vnen they apply to otner corporations. Thus the-
Feddpai Trade Commission becomes the enforcing body and the
^"uaicial body for the carrying out of these sections of the
Q
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(Jlayton Act, which attempt to supplemsnt the so-called anti-
quated Sherman Ant i- trust i^a.v.
r o .ver s and buties of tus r ea era I Irade oouimission
Ihe writer has considerea some questions of the trust
legislation of 1914. kow we must turn our attention to
the important body vvnich will enforce the provision of the
olayton Act. Ihe Act provides for a i-'ederal liade Commission
of five members appointed by the President 7;itn the advice
ana consent of the Senate .vith not over tliree frotr! the same
political party. Ine qudstion of their powers and ti.eir auties
is aividea into two main classes of work: first, invest-
igation and second, tna prevention oi unfair methods of
compe tit ion
.
Inve s tiga tion t o -vers
Let us consider first the powers of investigation. ihe
^om-iission has powers to investigate all corporations engaged
in comnerce other than banks ana common carriers ana to all
corporations in^Iuaing tliese which are alleged to be guilty
of violating tne anti- trust laws. under th^s power of
ini'es tiga tion relating to the corporation in commerce, the
commissioner lias power "to gather ana compile inform-
ation c oncerning and to invea ti^^^s te from time to time
the organization, business, conduct, practices ana Uie
management of any corporation engaged in coaimerce excepting
33. 'irusts, rools and vombinatiOi.s--hipiey--p. 710
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banks and common cariiers subject to the act to regulate
commsrcs. lo require by general or special orders Uie
corporations subject to the special control to file .vith
it annual reports or answers to specific questions filed
uncer oath." lUij corporation failing to ao so is subject
to a fine of one hundred dollars a day, and if the officers
make false reports, they are liacle to a fine of one thou-
sand to five tnousand aollars or imprisonment for a term
not to exceed three years.
As to the seconc class ..'hi on investigates all the
busines.es which are guilty of violating anti-trust laas,
there is a different metnod of investigation, upon the
direction of the iresident or either iiouse of v^ongress,
the commission may investigate and re,"^rt the fscts re-
lating to any alleged violation of the Anti-trust Act,
and upon application of the Attorney General to invest-
igate ana make recommendations for the readjustment of
the business of any corporation allegea to be violating
tne anti-trust acts, by making the business act acjording
to law, in this case, the uoramission may recommend
tnethods to i-eaajust the business practices and conduct and
management of any corporation. 'ihus the Liommission may
act as a ruide to tell the corporation what is legal and
what is not.
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t'ur thermora , tne L/Om.-iission may, after an investigation,
tell tiiera in .vhat way tney are violating the laiv ana iiovv
they may remedy tnis evil, many business men aesire some
assurance that they -vill be allowea to run their business
without interference by the governt.ient , and they are al-
lowed to do this by asking the Commission to aecide if a
certain practice is rirht or wrong. Furthermore, ^-'^upon
the request of the court and as a Lnaster in ci^ancery to
ascertain ana report an appropriate form of decree in any
suit in &ny ecuity brouj^ht under the direci, ion of the
Attorney General as provided in the iinii-trust /jGl."
The main reason this is helpful is that a dissolution decree
calls for skill, judgment and aetail of tecimioal knowledge.
Thus, raucn fairer and better types of dissolution decrees
will be made and the manufacturer will be helped considerably
u3t us consider a few of tne commission's investi;j;a tions
in 1915 the Uommission made an inv es tif a tion on tne price of
35,,
gasoline, and this report showea tue advance in tiie
price, the demand and supply, the cost of reotifyinp-, tjie
cost from tiie books of tns company, earnings, retail prices,
ana tiie position of tne Standard Companies . " In tne summary
the ooramission summarized the report and recommended that
the prices of gasoline were too ^igh and therefore there
should be a reduction.
34. Trusts, tools and Gombina tions --hipiey--p . 712
35. heport on tne irice of Gasol ine - -i^'edera 1 Trade Commission
June 26, 1919 Dec. 2b, 1919
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Let us consider some of tne reports and investigations
in other iinss of endeavor. in the investig tion of tae live
stock market in tne unitea States, tne i'edera i 'Irade Oom-
36
mission found and pu, lisnea the fol Lowing; "the live
meat market in the united States is dominated by five big
packing companies, bec/:iuse
I. they control tne principal stock yards at .vhich
live stock prices for the illation are made,
'c, tney buy m^jst of the Live stock .vhicli are soLd
at the principal stock yards and markets,
3. tixBv . tnrougn tneir control over ti-3 stock yards
and the exercise in djncert of their buying
po-ver, mf iuenue tiie activities of many of
tne Live stock proaucers wuose a.^ents Lhey
are
,
4. tiiey discriminate ana put at a greaL aisad vantage
inaepenaent buyers."
Ihis report becomes aval lab Le to the pubLic and tne Qom-
mission may, if it aesires, t&ke action against tne concerns,
m trie June 31, 1919 report tne GommissiDn founa that these
companies vere guilty of misbranding of tiieir ~oods and re-
commendea tnat tne companies aesist from this practice. After
getting all these investigations and reports, the Commission
often recom>nends a change in the business policies of the
companies
.
In 1920 a Commission investigatea tne cost of farm
implements ana brought in reports regarding the cost. In
1917 in tiie investigation of the paper business the oomraission
36. hsport on the laeat lacking Indus try- -Fed era 1 iraae
commission Keport--june 26, 1919
juec. 1919
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founa that the f oi-er-oii.;: finances in fact support
the cone Lus ion th&t the auvance in tiie price of book paper
in i91t .vas excessive and not iustified eitner by the in-
crease in cost or by the changes in condition of supply
ana ceraana." iney, tnsrefore, r ecoiii":encled s ciiange in
prices
.
Ihese inves tigat i->ns ana reports are very good, since
tney allow the public to knor; something concernin<T the mal-
practices of business as .veil as tne prices of gooas, ho.v-
ever, often times these reports create s great deal of trou-
ble for ti^e business, since many times tne public does not
agree aith tixe o^mmis siun ' s investigation. For example,
ho."/ many people vvoula believe that the iirmour company .vas
not lust anotner one .^f tne terrible monopolies. in 1923
the Armour Company bou^'iit the ivioi'ris uO::.pany ana ti;e i-ec-
ersl Trade womnission investigated the merri:er, but becretary
38
Jardine o.eciuea "tiiat tne purcnase li. one competiuor of
ti:e physical properties, business and good-.vill of anou.er
competitor is not in expresi^ terms condemnea by trust la>vs" .
xn fact he found that the merger v<as -vith tne idea of making
economies ana reaucmg expenses snu increasin,! saiss; there-
fore the investigation resulted in a finamg that the -com-
pany had uot cone anything, wrong.
37. 'li-e book iaper industry, a ^etter from the Jhaiiman of
the Federal 'irade Commiss ion--Federa l 'xraae
Uommission he port Liarch 10, 1917
38. Big lueat iv.er'ver L.enal, ihe - -x^iterary i>iges t- -Vo 1 . 87
uct. 10, 1925--p. 12
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In tnis typs of Lh3 .vork of zne t'eaert i ir de Commission
tne Kork has bean exceilent and has been s great source of
information to the public compe ti tor s ana ths liovernment as
.veil as tiie concerns investigated. in general these reports
have usually brought about a lowering- of the price of goods
'//hen the companies v/fire charging too high a rate.
ir event ion of unfa ir ivie thoGs
in adaition to its investigation po.vers the Commission
has power to prevent unfair metnoas of competition in com-
merce and this includes acts covered by tae Sherman Anti-
trust ijaw es well as by the Glayt>./n i^ct. Under this cuasi-
judiciai povver, the Commission is given po.ver to prevent
unfair methods of competition. Ihis proceeding usually is
startea by business men .HiO complain of the c orapeti tor ' s acts.
Then the commission usually hears those wno have objectea
and, if there is reason to beiieve that a person or company
uses unfair methods, it calls a conference of the company
complained of, ana tells them about the complaint. This,
uf late, has been dispensed ivith, because it has not been
successful, so in place of it the Commission has a more
formal proceeding.
in this formal proceeding, the Comnission dra^va up
a complaint and serves an officer of the company or an
individual by leaving a copy of tne complaint at the com-
pany's office. Then the person is ordered to ans.ver within
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thirty days and to admit or cisny the allegations. A
certain date is then fixed for the hearing. 'ihe Oom-
mission has the power to subpoena witnesses and near
arguments pro and con. At the conclusion of the iiear-
ing the commission makds a finding as to tlie facts and I -
issues, and ordsrs the company to desist froni the prac-
tice, or it dismisses the case, fractically all of the
infractior s are violations of tiie Sherman ^ct or the
(Jiayton net.. If tne company or pers^-n fails to obey
the order of the Commission, the Gomuiission may apply
to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the enforcement of
tiie order or the review of the cuestions. Generally,
the company complained of has acjepted the decision of
the oommission and has not appealed the decision, but
rati.er has accepted the findings of the commission and
39fihas rectified the v*ro-ng. cf the ' tnirty appeais
from the commission up to June 30, 19kii, there have been
seventeen decided upon, fifteen unfavorable to the Com-
mission ana t.vo favorable."
The great Question of unfair competition tvill
never be setiled until it is definitely decided //hat is
fair ana .vha t is not. in the earliest aays the traders
and merchants haa a la.; kno.v ^s the i^an ivi.jrchant, vviiich
regulatea dealings in trade. It .vas supposea to be an
39. Federal Trade Commission Service monograph of united States
iJO. 7 p. 2L
m
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expression of fair aealin_^s or rules of the f;:ame. These
laws have been used in many places, especially in the
Hanseatic cities, .vhere it is still in existence.
The federal Trade Commission has -One further and has
attemptea to enlarge upon this coae of business ethics.
40,,
The Ooramisbion has aescriiea 'fair competition as that
.Yhich obtains in the daily endeavor of tne business man
to succeed by tne peaceful and honest use of his .skill and
industry, to develop business ".vithuut takin? undue acvant-
age." ihis v*as a very good idea and tne Commission has
attempted to carry it out by preventing such unfair methods
as the following: false representation eoncerninn- the
standing of business methods of competitor, looal price
cutting, operation of boaus independent companies, special
competitive devices (fighting brands), rebates and pre-
ferential rates, black list, boycotts, espionage ana co-
ercion, and interf er en jes -vith contracts. iviore than
one hundred conferences nave bean held by a hundred in-
dustries tvith the Federal Trade Commission in an effort
to work out a coae of practices .viiich v/ouid tune in .vith
the year 19iiy." 'Ihis code while it has not been perfect
has bedn a great step in the right direction in bringing
ab^ut fair competition and the doing a;vay .vith pernicious
40.iMational Inaustries ana i-ederai Government Annals-Jan. 1916-p.3
41. ..hat's honesty? --Thompson--Col lier s ' vol. 8o--iViay 11, 191i9-p.6
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practice s.
In the early aa^s of the t'ederai Trade Comini ss ion, mem-
bers were non-communicative to those ^v-o sou.rnt advice about
trace practice. in fact, tue late V<illiam E. oolver, Ci-air-
42,
man of tue j?'ederal irada Gomaiisoion at one tiaia saio we
are not a court; it is our sole duty to prosecute those wiio
nave violatea the laiv by resorting to unfair practices." ne
did not realize that the Commission coula gain a great deal
of good-will by riving advice rather than prosecuting or
even persecuting companies.
Business demanded some changes in tnis idea and Mr,
Ooolidge took up the matter ^vitii the irade Commission.
43
"In the last ten years, the irade commission had changed
from its original purpose as defined by ,-.ilson and had
turned investig-ator and prosecutor and had built up a
bureaucracy costing one million dollars a year, .vhich
usurped certain functions of the Attorney General's office
..'ithout al'.vays justifying its energy by success in the
courts." This statement »vas made in 19<i5, ho-vever, Mr.
(Joolidge, as stated heretofore, has cnanged this idea
tremendously.
Today, the t'ederal Trade Commission confers v;ith the
business men, end business finds help rather than interfer-
42. t.'hat'a riune s ty- -Tnompson- -Co 1 lier s - - Vo 1 . b3--iviay 11, 1929 --p. 3
43, i, ill Ligger business be better business? Independent
Vol, 114 Feb. 28, 1925 p. 226
f
3n^'d as in ti'.e pSijt. t.jiiij ^ooLijge had a great deal to
do .vith txiis onanpe, great credit mast be given to former
Assistant Attorney General jjonovan, wno 'took t.e bull by
the horns' ana overtnrevv Uie raaeral Trade Comi-iiss ion.
.ihile ivir . ijonovan is not a member or the rederal Irade
Commission, he, as a member of the Department of Justice
in char^^e mergers ana trusts, has been a great help to
them. He figured that ' an ounce of prevention is .vorth a
pound of cure ' . Ihe minute an annouixceiaflnt was made in
the public press of one cotnpany buying another, or any
form of business consolidation '.vas mad a, the banker in-
volved, .vas sure to get a letter from i..r . Donovan, who
asked the banker to come do/m to nashington to tell him
his plans. If his department did not think the plans
.vere legal, he took action to see that they .vere not
carried out. In this .vay Wir . Donovan took over a great
deal of the v;ork from tiie shoulders of the i^'ederel Trade
Gomraiss ioa.
44
*^ Since 189 0, under tne Snerman ^mti-trust j^aw, one
million seven hundred ana fifty thousana seven hundred and
twenty seven dollars has been collected in fines, one fourth
of which was collected under Goionel wiiliam J. Donovan.'*
•vhat has been the result of all of these measures? Is the
federal Irade Commission a success? One editorial states
44. Donovan has Charge of Tha t- -Chart--Independent--Vol . 117
July 3, 1926 p. 8
#
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that "in askiiig tne tedei'sl irada Oomrniasion to invest-
igate tiie 'iobac> o Trust sna tne low^r 'iru: t3, congress has
given tuat body a ne.v lease of life." i:. otiier .vor^s, the
editorial v/riter suggests tuat the Gomnission is on its
last legs. in fact, everywhere, in spite of l.ir. Donovan's
ivonderful ivork, these La-.vs are found to be unsuccessful.
46
"Bpecif ica lly business heads are leaning increasingly
to.vard tne vie.v that tae bherinsn finti-trust ua-^ of 1B90
and the Anti-trust Act of 1914 are more or less obsolete.
Iheri -^-as been too much of trie biina conpetition -vnich
has hurt business. xn order to help corporations against
foreign competitions tney pas sea a Twebb act, vvnich per-
mits vendors of American merchandise to band together
in the export fie la that would be illegal at home."
ijet us consider //nat has happened. in spite of the
breaking up of co.npanies little reailv has been accom-
plished. j.resid-^nt laft's attornev General broke up
47
the Dupont uelMemours Company and "its (tne government's)
efforts to cripple tne po./er of the great coripany failed
completely and dia no good at all." i.ir. j_d'.vard h, Filene
in his book ' 'ihe ..ay out' states that -ve are going for./srd
in mass proauction and oniy tne stron@(7ill survive. Ihe
lar-e business is a necessity and it .vill Le the only
business -vhich ivili be able to increase ./ages anc lo./er
45. Return of tne Trust v^uestion, The --^ xter ar y uigest--
Voi. b4--j?eb. 2b, 19;c5--p. 10
4t. bust tne Trus t-- -»or lu ' s uark--Vol. bt--June 19;i-9--p. 1
47. Too iauch Government, loo luucn Taxa t ion--Pay--p . 7
€
prices as .'jell as :.rinn; profits to the manufa otur er
.
kost business men agree .vith ivir . t'iiene in tnis idea.
m spite of all tiie la.vs, what has happenea? i.e
usualiv r£;te a La^ ujK^on its efficacy to prevent ^hat
it is airaea at. f-.ii the trust la.i/s iiave aimed at the
prevention of monopolies and yet they have increasea
by leaps anc bounas in the isst few years. Vse have
arrived at tiie j.ast stsc-e of t;.e aevelopment of bus-
iness, the giant corporations under whicii all tne
former competing enterprises are formally completely
mer^zed. 'xhe lav.-s have not be 3n successful in tiieir
purpose to prevent monopoly, as ,vili be shoivn by our
next consiaeration, the mergers of recent times.
The 1-res ent Tr ena of ivionopo lies
"'ioday, 1926, it is statea that 66 per cent of the
flour sold in tne country ^^oes to tne baking trusts."
ihis trust Lias been rutnless in its acty, yet no one has
been able to stop it. .This trust attemptea to go even
further, by getting contr^-^l of tiie d&iry trade and fooa
stuffs, ho-vever, the government stt. ckec this proposal
..'ith 8n anti-trust suit against the Vi^^^rd Baking Company
and prevented a further merger. This decision should
have stemmed the tide, but it dia not. luergers 'pop up'
everywhere, even over night, and, as one writer states,
46. The breac irus t--Out look--Vol . 142- -April 21, 1926--
p. 568
f
54
49.
mergers are ever^^ .»here but in agriouiturs. n^n' iou.i ture
is unable to stabilize itself anc: tr.e lot of unmer.j'Qeble
inaustrv in a day of merrier is full of grief." in 192b
50
"iJonovan .varned six Hundred i\e.v York btate bankers
attenaing tneir annual convention at Quebec, that good
trusts and bad aliKe wil. suffer if tue people of the
unitsa States are aroused by the present tendency to'..'3rd
huge business mergers capable of restraining-^ trade." he
issued this .varning in l92b, but still big business in-
creases, 'ihe little man is unable to btand the strain
and is forced out of business even ti^ough he may be able
to sell at the same price,
£<ven our press is controlled by these large companies,
before the jceaarai irade uommission, the international
jraper ana power company admittea tnat it nad acouirea in-
terests of more than .jjlO^OOO/JOO in tiiirteen of the
countr y 's dailies. h'reeaom of tiie press is one of the
funaaraental guarantees of tue mTierican Bill of hirhts,
and trusts have gotten control of that. ±n fact, this
company no^j fixes the price of paper and makes contracts
51
to suit itself. 'ihsy have a ne.v contract form cir-
culated by tne international to its cusLomers, by vhich
the customers are given the option of signing up to buy
their paper for five years at an unspccifiea price--after
49. Mergers i_ver ywhei'e but in Agriculture --'me wation
Vol. 117--uctober
,
1926--p. 117
50. i o.ver Lenina tne iMevvspaper--ijiterar \ i)i!-e.st--Vol . 101
iviay 11, ly29--p'. 8
51. wno o.vns tne Daily irress?--tiie i\lation--vol
. 126
April 7, i9<c9--p. 446
t
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the first year--but tiiey may cancel, if prices increased
too mucii."' Ihus the small ne.vs^paper is tied nana and foot
by this paper group. tven tiie sour.d is ormed by these
trusts, 'ihe Victor 'laiking Machine, the Radio Corporation,
ana tne Keith urpheum i^yircuit of vaudeville control the
sound as well as our pleasures.
In txie food line, mergers are also taking place.
52
"fsasteg in purchasing, manufacturing and distribution
has teen deplorable because of the overlapping organizations
of practically fifty thousaxaa manufacturing units. it
.vas such a condition tnat j.;rompted the recent plan for
uniting the i-'leischman Company, L, w. Gillette Company
and tiie uhase and banborn Company in a ne.v holaing com-
pany". Banking also takes its place in the parade of
mergers with tne consolidation of the Guaranty irust i^ompany
and the National bank of commerce of l^e.v York, the l\ational
Oity and the i<arip.ers uoan and irust Coiapany, ana the old
Colony Trust and the First l^iational bank of boston.
53
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in fact, ''tiie financial press reports tliat more
than one hundred and t.venty-f ive consolidations took
place during the first ouarter of 1929. l-our of tiiera
involvea assets of al.jut one-sixth of tiie total resources
of all the banks in tue united States." The investment
ti'ust is a ne.v departure in the merger of securities
52, l^jew Food Merger, Tae--uutlook--Vol . 152--July 3, 1929--p. 134
53. FdNer but big:,er Banks - -Liiterary Digest--Vol. 101
May 25, 1929 p. 68 to 71
If
•.vitiiQUL anv of U.g respor.s ibi;.ii les or aoiuai proijerty
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tnanegeuisnt . "a SLuay of Lhirty-rive mergers s.iow that
in only thirtSan cases aiu tua average earnings exceed ihe
oorabined earnings of t^i-e separate units." In Sj^ite or -liiis,
mergers stiil go o:. . ^et us note a few of the mergers of
1928
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"l. Continental iMationai c&nVi ana irus t uo . and tne
Olivers laeroiiant irust Oompany of uiiicago
k; . bank of At-ierica anu tne r;Ov<ery and i.a3t Kivjr l\iationaL
3. Cm^ysLer ana Doage oompaxiies
4. Studebaker ana i-ierue Arrow
5. uonsoiiuateo. Gas of wev; York and the iirooklyn Ii-aison
0. American L-ignt and iraction and the onitsd States
iyignt and lower
7. Interns tiona I i\iokei company of ij en York and tne iViond
i^icksl company
6. Ihe International 'lei. ana leL. ana the idacKay Company
9. Radio Keith Albse, v/rpneum ana tne Film bookin,; offices
of ^*merica
10. I'an-Amer ican, Western Jtretroleum ana hichfield ail Company
11. »»algreen ao-:ipany axiu U.e bvans L-'rugs tores
Figg ly-V,iggly ana tna Kroger Grocery anc baking Company
iv3. ine Kansas City, hexico ana Orca ana tne Aitcnison,
'lopeka ana Ssnta Fs hailroads.''
Ihe merger movement is coming in most every inaustry
and just vaiei^e it is going to stop, no one knows or has any
iaea. In spite of all tns lai/s, the movement persists and
people are aemanaing tiie aboi isnm-ent or iawo against re-
straint of competition. rhe uew York oomraercial says that
5c
"there is no record of any gooa results fi-om prosecutions,
sucn as the reaerai naae commission instituted against the
Aluminum Company of America. i.ot a single jommooity or
54. hov; big is loo Big--oi';:'.<cers- Saturday ii.venin£^ xOst
Vol. 202--July 1-3, 1929--P.3
55. iwergers of 192&--Gamneck--«iur la 's V»ork--Voi. 5b--Jan. I9^;9
p. ^80
56. Is Ihere An Aluminum Irus t?--iji tsrar y L) iges t- - Vo 1 . 87
act. 17, 1925--P. IS
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service is now bought by tJrie peopis of this country at a
prioe ti^at is lower tnan tus one it paia before the l-'ea-
eral Ian against trusts Wc. s mvoksa." 'me lavjs ao not
seem to be carrying oat their design. As one '.vritsr states
57
"mergers are natural ana inevitable result of toe recent
trend, nigner pay and low prices, ac^ute competition re-
sulting from over production."
A recent study of mergers in inaus tr^* published by
58
the i\ational Xnuub trial oonference Board oeclares ''thc.t
in sixty liues of manufacturing ina^stry, the general up-
ward trena of prices has been much less pronounced in those
brancnes in which inaustrial consoliaation nave operateo.
Ihe rise in prices since 1900, in twenty-six businesses
wnose consoliaation has taken place wa a only £b.8 percent
against tj;:e rise of 117.4 percent aui'ing tne same periods
in twenty lines of manufac tui'es .viiich have not been af-
fected by combinations." ii-ven juages nave admitted Uia t
competition is not necessarily good, une states,
59
"i QO not u.ink tna l coiiipe titio n is invariably a pub-
lic benefit for it may be carried on to such a degree
as to becom.e a general evil."
Ir spite of all the gooa things wnich these people
may say about trusts, there are nevertheless many bad
things, r'ur the r:n or e
,
many businesses built up by men
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ratner tnan by compariiss nave been successful . lue Fora
iVi'jtor Company, CurLis iruolisiiing Company, tne rosturn
iiershey pood »^otnpany, anc the froctor Soap) company were
built by men anu tney have been just as successful, and
5'et they tiave not interfered v.'ith compstiLors in the
saine way as many of ths oiergea companies.
Thus, in spite of ali atteinpts by tns government to
regulate monopolies, tne monopolies have mci'eased ana one
can Look forivard (unieys s o..:e Lixing is dons j ana see that
in tiie future large companies /.'ill control all business
and co.iipdLi tion win be at an ena. ThaL Hill be the time
when v/e can really juage for ourselves the great evils
v;hich may occur. i,nile tiie "vvriter admits tnat there are
a number of aavantages to be gainea from large scale
proQuction, ne nevertheless fears the control of the
czars of business. aov/ever, r;e m.us t have some legislation,
but tiie writer v/ill leave that to tne- cone luo ion.
Ivpes of Liie li e w Ivionopo lies
ihe large corporation (or raergea companies; is the
latest phase of combination. ihe .vora 'trust' has been
popularly.- applied to all t-.ese types of companies --tne
trus c, tne holding comipany anu tne combination. ihus
,
a trust, as the y.'ord is popularly ucea, may be said to be
any consolidation or cum.bir.a tion or aggregation of a num-
ber of concerns in 8 ny particular line of business, .vnich
60. 'ihe irusts-- collier --p. 51
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pi'ior to Gombinai ion vvsre n&tura^Ly coinps titors . iha
essenLial point is Lixci anion, more or less formal, shouia
be with Ui2 inevitable result or a cessation of competition
between them."
In this recent trend of business, vje have had three
basic types of mer^er--the horizontal, the circular and
the vertical, j^et ua consider tnese 'types briefly. 'Ihe
iiorizontal merger is composea of joncsms making sim-
ilar, usually comj,;etin£;, products. Ihe vertical merger
com.prises concerns performing succeisive operations, the
finisheo procuct of one bein^^ Lhe raw material of the
next in line. 'me circular is one whicn is made up of
concerns making alliea or compl lu.antary products." ^s an
exaaiple or tne noi'lzontal merger, v;e find the chain stores
which are competing against e;..cij otner in fojo business,
buuh a merger mig.-i, be exempuriea by tiie i-irsi National
Stores ana txie i>orr mdr^er. An example of a vertical
merger, namely, tnat of tus separ: te stages in tne pro-
duction of a finisned product, would be the beuilehem
Steel corporation, vvnicn inuidentally has merged with the
Youngs town Kiteel doppor ti tion. 'me final type, the cir-
cular merger, wnich is tne buying up of allied or comp-
limantar^' products is exemt-lified by the liational Lisouit
dompany Waich accuire.. tiie Shredded ..heat (Jornpany (an allied
cl. 'lypes of iViergei—^.axton-- ^.or Ic ' s „ork--v'ol. bo
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product) in i9bb.
Tiius, we have tin-'ee types or mergers. however, many
mergers of late nave been hybria organizations, iiorizontai
vertical sno circular. As an example of tuis, 7.'e may con-
siaer tiie i.stionai ._-ise;ait company. oi-igiriaiiy it merged
with 'wracksr uocipany, tnen it graaually bougiit concerns
performing successive Oji. era tions . I'lnalLy in by its
pui'cxiase of tne Liirsaaeu r<heat company, it also became
Giro alar
.
benefits of luonop j ly
'j.o leaa one to think tnat trusts are inner entiy bad
would be unfair anu biasea opinion. b.-me are go:ia, some
are bad. «e must make lav/s for tne bad ones. <,na i are
the advantages of trusts or monopolies? une writer sug-
gests the following: "i-arge corporations will prevent
waste, will reouce cost of proauction, v/ill furnish
steauy emplo^^ment at an Increasea wage to tJxC employees,
\vill CO away '.vith ciilo labor in the sweat snop, will
lower prices of the finxshed procucts, will open new
markets, ana will bring within ti^e re-ch of tne masses,
at the Gueapest price, kinus and cuantities of goo.
s
obtainable, before the existence oi' txiese aggregations
of capital, will lessen dangers of proauction anc fur-
nisii a safequara against financial o if f iouit ies As
b2 . Vital Ai.ierican rroDlems--..iOntgoinery --p. 5
4
one of our gr 3 a test eoonornists, rTarik 'laussig, states,
'''ihe trust is a great snip ana it can liol^. its course
regardless of vrind &na wave, ano can carry on operations
ana keep people at work, rnocerate fluctuations of tu3-
iness, eliminate ruinous effect of cornpe tition, price-
cutting, ana stesaies incus tr ies
in order lo see tne advantages arising from mass
prouuction, let me consider the advantages arising from
masL producLion more coiripietely: 1. trusts are large
companies and buy more goocs. bmce they buy more gooas
they are able to purchase at s cheaper price, ana, thus,
save money for tne ultimate consumer. 2. 'ihey are able
to sell goods wiLh a smaller selling force, for wnon one
considers tiic auplicaiion tnat e/:iSLS unaer competition,
i.3 can easil;)' see hov; tnd ^ost of selling can be reauced
considerably. 'ihus '.ve fma another saving for tiie con-
sumer, o. By nbv mg many plants all thi ough the country,
tne trust is acle to cut. aown on tr ansporta tio;. cosls.
4. «ith coLipeting concerns, great amounts of advertising
are necessary; with one company very littie advertising
will be necessary, so tiia t the big corporation will again
cut oown on the expense of operation. 5. xhe large
Company is able to effect econoj.ies in proauctlo
., be-
cause they can afford to buy more ana better machines
which will cut down the cost of production. u. Due to
63. Pri..ciples of r..conomics laussig p. 455

the great amount of capital, tue large company can afford
to pay ana keep men working on new inventions, so tliat
greater mass procuction will be possible. 7. ir ^irtuermor e
,
because of the great sums of money it has, it is able to
exteno its trade outsica tns country. Ihus it can secure
foreign trace, w.iich the sraail company woula be u„able to
Qo. 8. irusts are a. Ie to aecnana cash payment ano thus
tney can au awa-;> wltii bac. debts .aiicn are auaeci to tne cost
of guoas by the small business man. 9. irusts are able,
because the'^ have a monopoly of tne iroG action an., aistrib-
ution of gooGs, to pi-event over -pr ouuc tiun anc the loss of
employment because of it. iJ. iney are also able to use t,he
by-proQuuts, vvniuh are often throvi'n away by tne small aeaier.
ror exsLiile, the bwift o^rnpany utilizes mucii of its waste
material making it into soap. 11. ihese companies are
able t^ get large amounts of money by issuance of bonds,
ana are not woi'rieu by banks foreclosing on mortgages.
ihi'ough all these saving's, the p7'0^, t.cts can be made
cheaper, salaries increasea, profits incieased, ana the
consuraer benefited by better proaucts. Nhen one consiaers
all of tnese a^.vantages, ns prol:ably believes that tnere
are not many oisaavantagcis . liovvever, tnsrc are aisadvant-
ages, ana tnat is one of ti^e reasons wny we must have some
regulation.
I
u3
i/'angers
lur . 'ihomas xMixori v^ai'vsr oi iiarvar-u, one of tiis isad-
ing economists of his sonooi, states uiat "Asi;-.e from
abusing i >^s bargaining power, tne one real oangei- from
conoe ntr^itea management is tua l it maj, become iv-r espons ibla--
we need not v/ori-^' aoout concentration ana mergers so
Long as tney are in the interests of meonanical efficiency
ana real economy. me tiling we need to guarc against is
that they ao xiot abuse ti^eir superior bargaining po.ifer."
ihus . uai-ver Six0»vs tne great cifficulty wiUi trusts,
t.i-eir irresponsibility. wniLe u.e trusos out oown ex-
penses of pi-oouCLion, ooes tne consumer leap the benefits?
xn spite of tne economies of the trusts, irresponsioie
management nas often raise.^ iiie price oi- has not ce-
creaseo the price. ihus, one of the gre^. test adv:>;rxtages
of tne trust is often useo for tneir 07in aggr anais emant
.
ine trust will nave control of the business anu tiie people
will have to accept -..air prices ai.u tiie workers wiLi
have to acoept tiie ir wages, now wiii we regulate these
big companies who pei'sisu in irresponsible management and
higii prices?
'out of four* nundreu trusts whicn tiie writer has
enumeratau, 1 ao not oeiieve tnat ten have lovvered tixeir
prices." t^usiness has existea with competition, and prices
fc4. niiere i>anger i^urks in iuergers--oarver--i»iagaziiie of Lusine
Vol. bu--August 192u--p. 17ii
b5. Vital American rrob iems--i»iontgomary--p . 12
I
u4
have bean aeciciQa by the lav^ of camana and supply, but
with a monopoly this will cease, niany Litriea the gre^t
proQucers secure advantages fiorn mere size, money and
pressure tnrougn politics, ana tivus enables him to ae-
stroy many smaller businesses wnich are serviceable.
i«ith iriQ advent of tne tnust, jut-iiiroat competition,
•price-cutting, illegal spying on tne firm, tying con-
tracts ana other wrong aevi--es oegan, and the little
firm was forcea out by unfair methods. ihis is a dem-
ocracy where t:.e rights of inaiviaual liberty must be
protected. hnile no one objects to fair methoas of
competition, they do object to unfair methocs, ana tnus
uemana control or regulation of tneae u.-.fair taciius.
if the little business man is forceu out of business
fairly, ne has no rignt to grumble. ine large business
can get control, because of its ejono-.iea, but it should
GO so fairly and squarely. .,nile tuese aangers apparent-
ly may not seem to be serious, tiiey are the causes of
many rauical outbursts. Anotner objection, wnich is not
so appci'ent today, is tL.e evil oi' over-capitalization, by
.vnioh ixie pui. lie was robbed of its fortunes.
ihus we are foi-ced by tjie unscrupulous to have laws
to regulate monopolies in tne interests of society. Years
ago when one company began to show great profits, other
companies were initiatea to compete with them in ordei' to
i
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get some profits. m tiiis v^ay vary fev/ oorapanias were
abla to ^ex a cionopoiy. buch is not tne oass at Liie
present -Liuie witii tnase new mergers, I'oi' tJiey are so
stu^^auGOUs that oti-ei'S refuse to compete witn tne in. ±n
a few yesi's tne oontroi of business ;viil be in t e hands
of a veiy few, how wiiL the ^_overnment protect the
people against ni^^h monopoly prices ana ui.aei-handed meth-
oas, wiilch will force ejonujiic slavery on the workers
of this couutry an., v^o away .<ith inaustrit:! aemocracy
(if there is sucn a tningj?
Solutions rroposoQ by utnsr
s
fne unite J btates nas at L.etnpte^. regulation of mon-
opoly by Common i-^aw, the Sherman Anti-ti-ust j^aw, the Clay-
ton iict anc tne i^scierbl Irada Cominiss lo n. regulation has
been a failure anu soirc otiier remeay must be founc. lous-
iness men ooject to the anti-tiust laws, because tney
attempt to interfere witn mass pi-oauctiun, wnxcn many
claim is essential to business. j-iie public objecto to
tne laws, because in Sj^ite of them prices remain tiio same
ana mergers take place even as i write.
t'urthermoi^e , t.^e Government is not satisfied, as can
be snown by the fact tiiat tne outstanding monopoly expert,
to,
Colonel Donovan, aavocatec tnat r euera 1_ in^.>us tr ia 1
wourt be established with jurisaicLion of all interstate
bC. 'ihe orge to iuurge --i^iterary biges t-- vo 1 . 10k;
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trads ana comtnerce, exuept pufciic utilities ti;at [.artiGs
entering into contracts or combi ,ation with eacii ot..er
shouLu have the rignt to suomit to tuis court tneir plans
for corabini:: tio n, for advice as 1,0 whetn^ir or not it violates
the Sherraau ^nti-tr^-st ^aw, an... tnat approval oj tnis
court shall be final.'' 'liius , tne tlirea gret interests,
the cOL.sumer, tne busines:: man ana tlie government
,
object to ti^e present law. in^: if fei-et^ce ..y t^.e people has
allowea this state of affairs to exist. m 1912 uir . Jay
in his book 't^ig business anu 0ov3rn;:i£nt ' suggested tnat
the oiiitec bt--. tes pass "an incorpor^^ t ion Ibm for co.cerns
doing interstate business, legalizing monopoly ana com-
binatiori ana not attemp'ting to control comuio^,! ty prices
but to give coiipicte anc absolute p^.blicity even of man-
ufacturing costs if too £re t z profit results a certain
percentage will be given over to the gov srnrnant
.
'««iliia:n Jennings rryan, tne great commoner, suggestea
Ob,.
tno.t "oongress snoulo. pass a law providing tna l no cor-
poration organized in any slate should: go business outsioe
the state in v/iii oh it is organized, unless ii receives in
some power crestea by Uongrsss a license auti.orizing it to
GO business outside of its own state ti-en the license
can be granted upon the conditions whiCii will prevent mon-
qpolv in any brancn of !:>usiness ai.o thci. provide that if
t.ie law is vioiatea, tne license can bd revokea.'' '^nis
to 7. big business ana Government--i''ay --p . 176
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proposition is ons-si^SL. and doss not £,iv3 fair prutecuion
to business
.
A rasmbsr of ina ojin-iv^rcs '^yomrnitts s of tns n./^di ican
Sar Asbooiation wouiu " "aiiow mo nop lis Lie practice
or rsstrcmt of trscs, if tiicy are in tiio p.bLxO mtercjt-
--tiie public interest bdii... asfinsa to ii.cluae lowering
of prices, ^ivin^: iiaprovea service, raising quality and
beitsiing concitions of labor. ihe Govarnjient woulo. levy
a tax of fifty percent on anything above a reasonable
profit uiade by sucn combinations--reaa^nabIe profit being
aefinea as sirht percent of tne actual mvesteu capital
or replacstnent value, vvi^icue ver xs gi'e^ter aftjr setting
asiae reserves fur o apre cxation, i:nprovernents , research
ana contingencies." ^.his idea is very gooc, but stil L it
allows a large profit, because tne govern^iient win only
tax fifty percent on tne amou.it over the reasonable amount,
and it h^ s no real liuiitations at ail, since tns company
can pi^y large amounts for salaiy.
•,e can realize that the settlement of this question v/a s
very aiff icult .viian we consider that i_,incoln in referring
70,.
to monopolies said mere never has been but one cuestion
in all civilization ; tiiere is but one cuestion in all
civi 1 iza -^ion; there is but ona question in the future and
that is: iiow to prevent a few men from saying to many men
69. Revising the Anti-trust L.aw--M8W Republic --Vo i . 54
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' v'ou work ana earn bread and wa wiil sat it.'" x.-is
cues Lion of monopoly is a grave one. S. rice it is a ..lost
important cuestion 1 iiave taken great pains to instrujt
myself in regard to it ana ± have reaonea s uefmite pol-
icy bassa upon facts ana knowledge of ot.-ers as well as my
o .vn.
My So lution
In order to get people to u..aerstaiid tne subjeci,
we must have more general education so tnat men can figlit
to live, ana special education in the public scnools in
economics so that men can fi^ht and unaerstana the nature
ana problems of monopolies, navmg educated tne public,
our next step is t elacL man to wiiom office is a public
trust and money is cneap. \»a must nave sou-ie leaders wno
will give service to tueir country ana will not allow big
business men to rule them. .»hen we get these public
spirited legislators and government executives in office,
our form of regulation will start.
First of all, I snoula organize a bureau of Corpor-
ations, just as i»illiam Jennings Bryan suggested, but
instead of hampering business, by forcing it to dissolve,
X snould put on an enormous tax to take care of unfair
methoas. 'liie power to tax is tiie power to aestroy, Ihis
Bureau of corporations v/oula license all corporations and
receive reports annually of its workings. 'ine aivision of
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corporations could then find out if business exacutivas
were receiving too much money (tnis woula have to oe ae-
wided by strong, fesriess men, liko 'x'Lsodore hooseveit).
if tiisy .vera, the commission '.vould have power to compel
tiie lowering of the salaries. inen the uoi-poration would
not be allowea to make any more than twelve percent on its
invested capital. ine residue of tne surplus woula go to
tne (jO vernaient and be Sixai^ea b;, tne public. m tnis way,
big business would not be eager to bring aoout unfair
methocs, because, in any event, they coula only get a
certain percent on tne ir investment. xhus , the companies
coula run big sc&la proau^tion an;^ woula not lose their
charter if they disobeyea tue now existing laws. m any
event they woulo receive only a certain peicentage.
l-'ur Liiermor c , i siioula compel a wide distribuiion of
stock of monopolies, by not allowing any inaividual to
own direcLly or indirectly more than a certain amount of
stock in a certain type of monopoly. ihus, x woula aiffuse
the profiLS by aiffusmg the siiareholaei' s . 'ii..-en, 1 would
get some shsres of stock wai»jn woula be sola to the em-
ployees, so that u^y would became s tocki-older s in u-d
business, ana receive some of tne rewards for honest
effort. Ihus, eventually, ownership in monopolies would
be an ownersiiip by the great maL.s of the public. instead
of a fev/ men controlling the corporations of the v/oria, the
ii
V
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workers, tiiS public ana tiie tig business men V7ili all have
an opi^ortunity and will x.ave some profit.
'iiiis soheme, tue definite «vorkings of which coL..ia be
workec out practically later, woulo be much superior to
the methods which have been tried up to the present. I
have attempted to offer a solution to the question iViiich
Lincoln saia was tne 'queatio.. of ail civilization', and
1 have at temp te.^ to answer this question with 'malice
toward none ana justice for all.'
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